



Security Council

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S/21957
21 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL

The attached letter, dated 16 November 1990, was addressed to the President of the Security Council by the Permanent Observer of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations. In accordance with the request contained in the letter, the text is being circulated as a document of the Security Council.

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Annex

Letter dated 16 November 1990 from the Permanent Observer of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations
addressed to the President of the Security Council

H.E. Mr. Thomas R. Pickering
President
Security Council
United Nations

I have the honour to forward to you the text of the Statement of
16 November 1990 of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea.

I request that this letter, together with the enclosed Statement of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, be
circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) PAK Gil Yon
Ambassador
Permanent Observer

Enclosure

Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Democratic People's Republic of Korea

To remove the danger of a nuclear war in Korea is a very urgent problem both in view of the strained situation prevailing on the Korean peninsula and of peace and security in Asia and the rest of the world.

The DPRK Government joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as part of the practical measures to resolve this problem and, on June 23, 1986, put forward a proposal to convert the Korean peninsula into a nuclear-free, peace zone. And on November 9, 1989, it proposed negotiation concerning the issue of the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula and has made every sincere effort to put it into effect.

If this measure had been carried into practice, it would have been greatly conducive to realizing the idea of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the Korean peninsula and strengthening the nuclear non-proliferation system worldwide.

Though much time has passed since then, there has been no progress in the settlement of this problem. The U.S. authorities, calling the DPRK to account for the failure to sign the safeguards agreement under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty between the DPRK and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), are now crying that it would deter the improvement of its relations with the United States and affect the improvement of its relations with other countries, too.

Such allegation of the United States is nothing but an attempt to reverse the fact itself and lead the problem to an erroneous direction.

According to an announcement of the IAEA some time ago, the question of signing a nuclear safeguard agreement has not yet been solved not because of the relations between the IAEA and our country but because of the relations between the DPRK and the United States. This is a view which correctly reflects the present situation.

Truth to tell, there have been several rounds of sincere negotiations between us and the IAEA and, as a result, an agreement in principle for signing a nuclear safeguards agreement has been reached and we are ready to sign it any moment.

But the point here is that the United States which should discharge its obligation under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has deployed more than 1,000 pieces of nuclear weapons in south Korea and refuses to give assurances that it would remove the threat of nuclear attack on our country, a non-nuclear state.

As is clear to everyone, we can sign a nuclear safeguards agreement only on condition that the United States gives legal assurances that it would not resort to a nuclear threat against us.

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty premises a guarantee of the security of non-nuclear nations. If the United States which poses a direct nuclear threat to our country has the intention to faithfully fulfil its obligations under the treaty as the state with which the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is deposited, and truly wants us to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement, there is no ground for it to refuse to give assurances that it would remove the nuclear threat to us as we justly demand.

It is entirely unjust for the United States to speak ill of us while failing to do what it should do and cry that the problem of the nuclear safeguards agreement is a precondition in the improvement of the DPRK-U.S. relations and it has bearing on the improvement of relations with other countries, too.

The Government of our Republic is prepared to sign a nuclear safeguards agreement in conformity with its nuclear-free, peace policy and is making efforts for its materialization. If a nuclear safeguards agreement is to be signed today when all the problems between us and the IAEA have been solved, it is necessary to hold negotiation between the DPRK and the United States. But the United States does not respond to our proposal for negotiation.

If the United States want to use for any other purpose the problem of signing a nuclear safeguards agreement which is an issue between the DPRK and the United States, it will only make this problem more complicate and will not serve as a way for the solution of this issue.

For us who are under the constant nuclear threat of the United States, the question of signing a nuclear safeguards agreement is directly linked with the question of removing the danger of nuclear war on the Korean peninsula in accordance with the idea of the treaty and defending the fundamental interests of the country and the right to existence of our nation. We will not allow this to be an object of diplomatic bargaining. If the United States want to see the solution of the problem of signing a nuclear safeguards agreement, it should come out to the negotiating table with us at an early date.

The DPRK Government declares once again that it will, in the future, too, take sincere efforts to solve this problem and is ready to respond to negotiation with the United States for the purpose.



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LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to enclose herewith the text of the law concerning Support for the Islamic Revolution of the Palestinian People ratified by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and approved by the Council of Guardians of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

It would be highly appreciated if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Kamal KHARRAZI
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

Law concerning Support for the Islamic Revolution of the
Palestinian People

Article 1

Palestinian territory belongs to the Palestinian people and the occupier régime of Al-Quds and the illegal rule of the Zionist which has dominated over this land and Bayt-al-Moqaddas are usurpative, oppressive and condemnable. It is incumbent upon all nations and all justice-seeking men and women, especially Muslims and particularly the people and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, to support and defend by all means possible the oppressed, displaced and combatant Palestinian people until their legitimate rights are achieved.

The Presiding Board of the Islamic Consultative Assembly shall by different means strengthen and promote this support for the Palestinian people and shall as soon as possible hold a conference in this connection with the participation of representatives from Islamic countries and authorities on this subject.

Article 2

The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran may establish a fund for the humanitarian assistance to the Palestinian people and collect the contributions of Muslims and freedom-loving individuals for helping and strengthening the Palestinian refugees and the intifadah of the oppressed and combatant people in the Palestinian land.

Article 3

The Foundation for the Martyrs of the Islamic Revolution (Bonyad Shahid) and the Foundation for the Deprived and the Disabled of the Islamic Revolution (Bonyad Mostazaafan va Janbazan) shall with the permission of Valie Amr and the Red Crescent of the Islamic Republic of Iran support, materially and morally, and within their capability the families of the martyrs, the disabled, prisoners and missing persons in the occupied territories as well as the martyrs from other parts of the world who gave their life for the liberation of Palestine.

Article 4

The Ministries of Culture and Higher Education and Health, Treatment and Medical Education shall allocate an annual quota in the universities of Iran for Palestinian applicants.

Article 5

For the purpose of follow-up and co-ordination, a committee comprising fully authorized representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, the Martyrs' Foundation (Bonyad Shahid), the Commander in Chief of the Islamic Revolution Guard Corps, the Ministry of State Intelligence, the Foundation for the Disabled (Bonyad Janbazan), the Red Crescent and two of the deputies of the Islamic Consultative Assembly, appointed by the same Assembly, shall be established under the supervision of the President or his representative. This committee shall report to the Islamic Consultative Assembly every six months on the actions taken.

Article 6

Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Voice and Vision of the Islamic Republic of Iran (radio and television) shall accord priority to supporting the Islamic revolution of Palestine in their overseas programmes.

Article 7

Considering the historical background of Bayt al-Moqaddas, the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran recognize this city as the home and the seat of the Islamic government-in-exile of Palestine and calls on all Islamic countries to recognize this city as the seat of the Islamic government-in-exile of Palestine.

Article 8

Establishment of economic, commercial and cultural relations with companies, institutions and enterprises affiliated to the Zionists throughout the world is forbidden.

Note: The Ministry of Foreign Affairs shall within a year identify as much as possible Zionist companies, institutions and enterprises throughout the world and submit the full list to the Islamic Consultative Assembly and the Council of Ministers.

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The above law consisting of eight (8) articles and one (1) note was ratified on Wednesday, 9 May 1990 by the Islamic Consultative Assembly and approved on the same date by the Council of Guardians.



General Assembly Security Council

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GENERAL ASSEMBLY
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Agenda item 28

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY AND PEACE INITIATIVES

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

Letter dated 23 November 1990 from the Permanent Representative of
Mexico to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

On instructions from my Government, I would be grateful if you would have this letter and the attached text circulated as an official document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 28, and of the Security Council. The document contains the declaration of the Group of Three on the events in the Republic of El Salvador, issued at the conclusion of the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of Colombia, Venezuela and Mexico in Mexico City on 22 November 1990.

(Signed) Jorge MONTANO
Ambassador
Permanent Representative of Mexico
to the United Nations

ANNEX

Declaration of the Group of Three on the events in El Salvador,
made in Tlatelolco on 22 November 1990

The Foreign Ministers of the Group of Three meeting in Mexico City hereby express their concern about the recent escalation of violence in their sister Republic of El Salvador beginning on 20 November 1990 and call for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

In addition, the Foreign Ministers of the Group of Three urge the parties to the conflict to return to the negotiation channels opened by the mechanisms made available to them by the international community and, in particular, by the Secretary-General of the United Nations, with whom the three countries are engaged in special co-operation on this matter.

Finally, the Foreign Ministers reiterate their confident hope that the parties to the conflict will fully assume their responsibility for restoring peace in El Salvador.



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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP

(for the period 22 September 1990-20 November 1990)

Introduction

1. Part I of the present report is submitted in pursuance of paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 671 (1990) of 27 September 1990 in which the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to submit, during November, a report on his further consultations with the parties about the future of the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG), together with his recommendations on that matter. Part I also describes the Group's activities during the two-month mandate period which is about to end.

2. Part II of the report is submitted in pursuance of subparagraph (c) of the sole paragraph of Security Council resolution 651 (1990) of 29 March 1990 and reports on my efforts aimed at implementing Security Council resolution 598 (1987) of 20 July 1987.

I. UNITED NATIONS IRAN-IRAQ MILITARY OBSERVER GROUP

3. It will be recalled that, in paragraph 40 of my report of 21 September 1990 (S/21803), I recommended that, during the two-month extension period that I had proposed, UNIIMOG should concentrate on three tasks which it was already performing, namely:

(a) Verifying, confirming and supervising the remaining stages of the withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized boundaries;

(b) Helping the parties to resolve any local tensions that might arise, e.g. as a result of differences about the exact line of the border, moves forward, accidental firings, etc.;

(c) Assisting the parties in establishing an area of separation, that is an area on either side of the border into which each party would agree not to deploy military forces.

I also had it in mind, although this was not explicitly stated in my report, that, if the parties agreed to establish an area of separation, the next step would be for them to negotiate an area of limitation of armaments on the lines suggested in paragraph 3 (g) of my report of 7 August 1988 (S/20093), which was approved by the Security Council in its resolution 619 (1988) of 9 August 1988.

Composition, command and deployment

4. The command of UNIIMOG continued to be exercised by the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Slavko Jovic (Yugoslavia), until 14 November 1990, when he returned to his country's service. Brigadier-General S. Anam Khan (Bangladesh), the Assistant Chief Military Observer on the Iraqi side, took command of UNIIMOG as Acting Chief Military Observer upon the departure of Major-General Jovic. On the Iranian side, Brigadier-General P. Kallstrom (Sweden) continued as the Assistant Chief Military Observer until 30 September 1990, when he returned to his country's service and Colonel H. Purola (Finland) became Acting Assistant Chief Military Observer.

5. As recommended in paragraph 40 of my report of 21 September 1990 (S/21803), UNIIMOG's military observers have been reduced to about 60 per cent of their previous strength. The civilian staff have also been reduced by about 20 per cent. In the course of this reduction, the military observers in the field have been redeployed in three sectors on the Iranian side, with headquarters at Saqqez, Bakhtaran and Dezful, and three on the Iraqi side, with headquarters at Sulaymaniyah, Mansuriyah and Basrah. Each of the sector headquarters controls two team sites, one of which is co-located with it. This deployment is shown on the map annexed to the present report.

6. On 20 November 1990, the strength of UNIIMOG, including headquarters staff in Teheran and Baghdad, was as follows:

United Nations military observers

Argentina	0
Australia	8
Austria	9
Bangladesh (including the Acting Chief Military Observer)	5
Canada	8
Denmark	6
Finland	9
Ghana	2
Hungary	15
India	11
Indonesia	5
Ireland	2
Italy	11
Kenya	2
Malaysia	15
New Zealand	1
Nigeria	16
Norway	8
Poland	9
Senegal	4
Sweden	9
Turkey	3
Uruguay	9
Yugoslavia	11
Zambia	6
	184

Air Unit

New Zealand	17
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Military Police Unit

Ireland	25
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Medical Section

Austria	4
Total, military personnel	230

Operations

7. During the reporting period, the two sides almost completed the process of withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries as described in the Treaty concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations between Iran and Iraq 1/ of 13 June 1975 and its protocols and annexes. Iraqi forces occupied, or re-occupied, positions on or close to the border, while Iranian forces continued to move forward and in their turn established positions on or close to the border. Both sides exercised maximum restraint during this process. In some cases local tension occurred when the two sides established positions along the border in close proximity to, or even co-located with, each other, but there were no serious incidents.

8. Difficulties also occurred because of the presence of unmarked minefields in areas from which the forces were withdrawing, especially on the Iranian side of the border. UNIIMOG tried to arrange an exchange of minefield maps and sketches and any other relevant information that the parties could provide to each other. It was also suggested that Iraqi officers familiar with minefields laid in Iranian territory from which Iraqi forces had withdrawn could visit the Iranian side in order to provide relevant information. Unfortunately it has not yet proved possible to implement arrangements of this kind and the Iranian side has suffered a number of military and civilian casualties from mines. UNIIMOG observers were themselves involved in three mine incidents, fortunately without serious injury.

9. In accordance with the tasks described in paragraph 3 above, UNIIMOG concentrated its efforts on supervising, verifying and confirming the withdrawal of the two sides' forces and their assumption of new positions on or close to the border. It defused any local tensions that occurred and deployed an average of 31 patrols daily, concentrating on areas of potential or actual difficulty. Some of these were joint patrols comprising military observers from UNIIMOG's detachments in both countries. Excellent co-operation was received from the two Governments, and UNIIMOG patrols have recently been given access to certain restricted areas which they had previously been unable to enter.

10. On 20 November 1990 there were still 18 Iraqi positions that UNIIMOG judged to be on the Iranian side of the border and 24 Iranian positions that were judged to be on the Iraqi side. In each case UNIIMOG has requested the party concerned to withdraw from the offending position. This number of disputed positions represents an increase since I last reported to the Security Council in September. The increase results from the general process of withdrawal and assumption of new positions on or close to the border described in paragraph 7 above. It also reflects, in some cases, the difficulty of identifying on the ground the border described in the 1975 Treaty. However the strength of the positions in question is not significant: they vary in size, some consisting only of a single flag and, with one exception, none exceeds platoon strength. The infringement of the other side's territory nowhere exceeds 1,000 metres in depth.

11. UNIIMOG has continued to promote the idea of an area of separation and an area of limitation of armaments on either side of the border as a means of building confidence and reducing the risk of incidents. The Chief Military Observer

transmitted to both sides on 20 and 21 August 1990 proposals in this sense. At one time or another, each side has informed UNIIMOG that it agrees in principle to UNIIMOG's proposals, subject to further study and discussion of the modalities. It was hoped that during the process of withdrawal each side would refrain from establishing or occupying positions within one kilometre of the border and that a de facto area of separation might be established in this way. In practice, as reported above, this could not be achieved and each side now occupies more than a hundred positions within the proposed area of separation. In recent consultations, however, both sides have again stated that they accept the principle of an area of separation and that they are ready to enter into discussions about detailed arrangements for its establishment.

12. It had from the beginning of UNIIMOG's mandate been envisaged that discussion of these matters would take place in the Mixed Military Working Group that UNIIMOG has been endeavouring to establish since it was first deployed, although other mechanisms could be contemplated. Hopes were raised during October 1990 that it would be possible to hold the first meeting of the Mixed Military Working Group before the end of that month. On the basis of indications received from both parties, the Chief Military Observer duly convened the first meeting for 28 October 1990. It was scheduled to take place at UNIIMOG headquarters at Teheran, with the second meeting being held at UNIIMOG headquarters at Baghdad. However, consultations with the two delegations immediately before the meeting brought to light certain remaining difficulties of a political nature that could not be solved at the technical and military level. The Chief Military Observer therefore decided to cancel the meeting.

13. UNIIMOG has continued to promote the repatriation of war dead and has communicated to both sides localities where bodies are known to be present. During the reporting period 10 Iraqi and 3 Iranian war dead were repatriated.

Consultations with the parties

14. As envisaged in paragraph 41 of my report of 21 September 1990 (S/21803), I have undertaken consultations with the two parties about the future of UNIIMOG after the expiry of the current mandate period. Both parties were informed that, on the basis of reports received from UNIIMOG since the withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized boundaries began, I was inclined to think that UNIIMOG had a continuing role to play in facilitating the early solution of residual problems arising from the withdrawal and in helping the parties to negotiate and implement agreements on an area of separation and an area of limitation of armaments. A number of options for renewal of the mandate were put to them. The options varied as to the duration of the extension and as to the strength and deployment of UNIIMOG; both variables, of course, depended on what tasks it was thought appropriate that UNIIMOG should undertake in the future.

15. As regards duration, it was suggested that this could range between two and six months. Three options were mentioned for the strength of UNIIMOG: maintenance of the Group at its present strength of approximately 100 military observers on each side, deployed as described in paragraph 5 above; reduction to a strength of

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50 to 60 observers on each side, deployed at the existing sector headquarters but without any permanently manned team sites; or reduction to about 20 observers on each side, deployed only in the two capitals, from where they would travel to investigate incidents on the border, as required. The parties were told that I thought that if the mandate was extended it should be for a longer period than two months and that I was inclined to favour the second of the three options relating to UNIIMOG's strength.

16. The Iraqi authorities expressed a strong preference for the mandate to be renewed for a full period of six months, with UNIIMOG remaining at its present strength.

17. The Iranian authorities initially expressed the view that paragraph 2 of resolution 598 (1987) had been almost completely implemented, that progress had been made in recent months in the bilateral relationship between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and that in those circumstances it was doubtful whether there was a continuing need for a third party to be involved in any problems that might arise in relation to the cease-fire or withdrawal of forces, which could be resolved through direct contacts between the two sides. However, after detailed discussion of the manner in which UNIIMOG has been carrying out its tasks since mid-August 1990, the Iranian authorities agreed that the mandate of UNIIMOG should be renewed, but with a reduced strength of 50 to 60 military observers on each side (i.e. the second option referred to in paragraph 15 above) and for a period of only two months.

18. Both sides expressed the view that during a renewed mandate period UNIIMOG's tasks should be:

- (a) To resolve the remaining problems on the border;
- (b) To try to arrange an exchange of information between the parties about unmarked minefields;
- (c) To assist the parties in negotiating and implementing an area of separation and, thereafter, an area of limitation of armaments.

Both sides also expressed the view that the difficulties that had led to cancellation of the first meeting of the Mixed Military Working Group on 28 October 1990 should be resolved by means of direct contacts between them at the political level and that, meanwhile, UNIIMOG should continue to carry out the above tasks through consultation and negotiation with each of them separately, without waiting for establishment of the Mixed Military Working Group.

Financial aspects

19. By its resolution 44/189 of 21 December 1989, the General Assembly authorized the Secretary-General to enter into commitments for the operation of UNIIMOG, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of the Group, at a rate not to exceed \$7,068,000 gross (\$6,904,000 net) per month for the six-month period

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from 1 October 1990 to 31 March 1991. This authorization was subject to the prior concurrence of the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions as to the actual level of commitments to be entered into. If the Council decides to extend UNIIMOG beyond its current mandate, as recommended in paragraph 26 below, the costs to the United Nations for maintaining the Group during the period recommended will be within the commitment authorized by the Assembly in its resolution 44/189. Appropriate financial provision would need to be made by the General Assembly at its current session in respect of periods after 31 March 1991, if the Security Council should decide to extend the mandate of the Group beyond that date.

20. As at the beginning of November 1990 unpaid assessed contributions to the UNIIMOG Special Account for the mandate periods since its inception up to 30 September 1990 amounted to \$9.8 million.

Observations

21. I had hoped that, as in September 1990 (S/21803, para. 41), I would be in a position to report to the Security Council that the two parties shared a common view on the future of UNIIMOG. Unfortunately, this is not the case. It is however encouraging that both sides agree on the tasks that UNIIMOG should perform should the Security Council decide to extend its mandate. I am myself convinced that the tasks listed in paragraph 18 are appropriate ones for the United Nations, through UNIIMOG, to undertake and that, if successfully carried out, they will make an important contribution to the full implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987).

22. If the Security Council shares this view, the questions to be decided are the future strength of UNIIMOG and the duration of its next mandate period.

23. As reported above, the authorities of Iraq would like UNIIMOG to remain at its present strength, whereas those of the Islamic Republic of Iran favour a reduction to about half that strength. My own view, based on advice received from Major-General Jovic before his departure from the mission and from Brigadier-General Anam Khan, the Acting Chief Military Observer, is that a strength of up to 120 military observers, that is 50 to 60 on each side, should be sufficient to enable UNIIMOG to carry out the proposed tasks, on the assumption that both sides will extend their full co-operation to UNIIMOG and, in particular, facilitate its prompt access to areas of dispute. In making this observation, however, it is necessary to add that, if the parties wished UNIIMOG to verify the implementation of eventual agreements on areas of separation and limitation of armaments, it would almost certainly be necessary to reinforce the Group's strength, at any rate in the initial stages.

24. If UNIIMOG's strength is reduced to a level not exceeding 120 military observers, it would be appropriate for the Chief Military Observer to hold the rank of Brigadier-General, with commensurate lowering of the rank of senior staff posts. If, therefore, the Security Council approves the recommendation set out below, I shall in due course, following the usual consultations, seek its approval

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for the appointment of a Chief Military Observer in the rank of Brigadier-General. I shall also take steps to adjust the size of national contingents which, as is shown by the table in paragraph 6 above, have become unbalanced as a result of the process of attrition used to achieve the reduction from 350 military observers to the current strength.

25. As regards the duration of the new mandate period, there is a significant gap between the two months favoured by the Islamic Republic of Iran and the six months favoured by Iraq. During the recent consultations, the Iranian authorities were urged to accept a renewal for at least four months. This was for two reasons. First, experience since the present phase of withdrawal began in mid-August 1990 suggests that it is unrealistic to expect UNIIMOG to be able to complete the tasks described in paragraph 18 in only two months; secondly, a further mandate period of such short duration would give rise to numerous administrative difficulties, especially as regards correction of the existing imbalance between national contingents and the need to release and replace officers who have already exceeded their allotted tour of duty. However, the Iranian authorities have informed me that they are not able to accept an extension of the mandate for more than two months, although they do not exclude the possibility of a further extension thereafter. In these circumstances, I see no alternative but to accept that at this stage the mandate cannot be extended for more than two months.

26. I accordingly recommend that the Security Council should decide to extend the mandate of UNIIMOG for a further period of two months, that is until 31 January 1991, with a strength not exceeding 120 military observers, plus the necessary support personnel, and with the tasks described in paragraph 18 above.

27. It remains only to pay tribute to the men and women of UNIIMOG, both military and civilian, and especially to the recently retired Chief Military Observer, Major-General Slavko Jovic, for the rapid and efficient way in which they responded to the withdrawal of forces and to the new situation on the internationally recognized boundaries and for the patience and fortitude with which they have faced the uncertainties about UNIIMOG's future and coped with difficulties arising from the wider situation in the region.

II. IMPLEMENTATION OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 (1987)

28. As noted in my report to the Security Council of 21 September 1990 (S/21803), I had intended to describe my efforts to bring about full implementation of resolution 598 (1987) in an addendum to be issued following my anticipated meetings with the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and of Iraq during their visits to New York on the occasion of the general debate in the General Assembly. However, the visit of the Foreign Minister of Iraq did not take place. The present report includes, therefore, a description of my efforts since 22 March 1990.

29. Over the past eight months important steps have been taken towards the implementation of Security Council resolution 598 (1987). The period began with a continuation of my efforts aimed at bringing about appropriately structured direct

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talks between the Foreign Ministers of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq on the basis of the specific agenda that the Security Council supported in its statement of 27 February 1990.

30. In letters of 25 March from H.E. Mr. Tariq Aziz, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, and 3 April from H.E. Mr. Ali Akbar Velayati, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran, it was evident that, while both sides would favour the convening of a meeting of appropriately structured direct talks, their expectations of what such a meeting would entail were at variance.

31. In an effort to clarify some of the points contained in those letters, my Personal Representative, Ambassador Jan Eliasson, held a series of meetings in New York with the Permanent Representatives of the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq. I met in New York on 25 April with the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Iraq, H.E. Mr. Wisam al Zahawi and on 26 April with the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

32. In late April, Foreign Minister Velayati informed me, a few days after its receipt, of a letter the President of Iraq had transmitted to the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran. The Iranian authorities also informed me of their reaction to the letter and, at a later stage, of their response. This was followed by a further exchange of letters between the two heads of State and the commencement of a series of direct bilateral contacts between the two Governments at Geneva.

33. On 14 May I met at Rome with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, who briefed me about the Iraqi initiative in some detail. The Iraqi Minister made it clear that his Government saw this initiative in the context of the effort aimed at implementing resolution 598 (1987). That was also the basic element of the response provided by the Islamic Republic of Iran.

34. On 2 July I met at Geneva with the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran and on 3 July with the Foreign Minister of Iraq. In the afternoon of the same day, I was able to convene, in my presence, a joint meeting of the two Ministers who were accompanied by a few members of their delegations. This afforded the first opportunity for direct contact between the two Ministers since the meetings of April 1989. In the course of the joint meeting of 3 July both sides reaffirmed their commitment to the implementation of resolution 598 (1987), which remained the framework within which all contacts between the two sides were taking place, as well as their support for the role of the Secretary-General in that connection. Immediately after my meetings with the Ministers in Geneva, my Personal Representative held follow-up discussions with officials from both sides.

35. Bilateral contacts continued between the two sides. In a letter to me dated 15 August, the Foreign Minister of Iraq transmitted copies of letters dated 30 July and 14 August from his President to the President of the Islamic Republic of Iran (S/21528). In a letter to me of 17 August, the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran transmitted a copy of his President's letter of 8 August to the President of Iraq (S/21556). These communications indicated that the

implementation of the resolution would be carried out in accordance with the Treaty and Conventions to which the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq were parties. In October, the two Governments resumed diplomatic relations. Iraq also provided me with the texts of communications the President of Iraq sent to his Iranian counterpart dated 21 April, 19 May, 21 June, 16 July, 2 August and 3 August 1990, and I have been informed that the Islamic Republic of Iran intends to do the same with its own letters.

36. Concurrent with the commencement on 17 August 1990 of the withdrawal of forces to the internationally recognized borders, which I have described earlier, both sides also began to repatriate their prisoners-of-war. While a substantial number of prisoners have been exchanged, the repatriation came to a halt on 15 September 1990. The parties indicated to me, however, that this issue is being discussed in their bilateral contacts, and it is hoped that the repatriation of prisoners-of-war will soon be resumed in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949. 2/

37. I have remained in contact with both sides regarding their own bilateral exchanges and the implementation of the resolution. On 1 September, during the course of my meeting at Amman with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, I also had an opportunity to elicit his views on resolution 598 (1987). On 26 September I met in New York with the Foreign Minister of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who noted that, throughout the course of the efforts to implement the resolution, his Government had always tried to keep the role of the Secretary-General "pivotal and central in the process". He added that the Islamic Republic of Iran continued to believe that the Secretary-General "must remain on the scene in order to complete the implementation of the resolution". In the Islamic Republic of Iran's view, paragraphs 1 to 4 were being implemented, while paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, which conferred a mandate on the Secretary-General, still were not implemented.

38. As stated in paragraph 28 above, while I had anticipated a similar meeting with the Foreign Minister of Iraq, his visit to New York could not take place as scheduled. However, on 4 October the Permanent Representative of Iraq delivered an oral message from his Government to my Personal Representative. It began by noting that it had been Iraq that had taken the initiative "to untie all the knots" that had made it difficult to make progress. It had been Iraq that had also taken the initiative by withdrawing and starting to repatriate the prisoners-of-war. Iraq believed there was "a great number" of Iraqi prisoners-of-war yet to be accounted for. It was observed that when the Foreign Minister of Iraq had visited Teheran on 9 and 10 September, it had been agreed that the two sides "would continue their bilateral contacts regarding other matters as well". The Iranian Foreign Minister had promised to visit Baghdad, and for that reason, Iraq preferred "to wait and see what outcome might issue from the bilateral contacts". As for the role of the Secretary-General, the message continued, Iraq had "always attached great importance to it". The return visit of Foreign Minister Velayati to Baghdad took place on 14 and 15 November. At the conclusion of the discussions in Iraq, the two sides agreed to resume the repatriation of prisoners-of-war as of 21 November.

Observations

39. The withdrawal to the internationally recognized boundaries between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran, as described in the Treaty concerning the State Frontier and Neighbourly Relations between Iran and Iraq of 13 June 1975 and its protocols and annexes, was the result of a political process that changed the relations between the two countries. That process received new impetus in April 1990 when the head of State of Iraq addressed a letter to his counterpart in the Islamic Republic of Iran. The correspondence between the two leaders that followed in May, June, and July and, in particular the positions taken in the exchanges of August, made possible the implementation of paragraph 1, and to a large extent, paragraph 3 and paragraph 4. Discussions continue as to the implementation of the remaining paragraphs of the resolution.


40. When the Security Council adopted its mandatory resolution on the conflict between the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq, it was clear that its ultimate aim was the re-establishment of good-neighbourly relations and the enhancement of the security and stability of the region. While implementation of important parts of the resolution is a welcome development, it must be noted that the fundamental change in the relations between the two countries has come at a time of new crisis for the region. I wish to recall here that both Governments, having accepted resolution 598 (1987), are committed to its full implementation. As contacts continue between the two Governments to put their relations on a normal footing, it appears that paragraph 8 of the resolution, which requests me to examine, in consultation with the Islamic Republic of Iran and Iraq and with other States of the region, measures to enhance the security and stability of the region should at an appropriate time be looked at anew.


41. It seems to me that the full implementation of resolution 598 (1987) could well contribute to a marked improvement of the situation in the region as a whole. I therefore intend as appropriate to remain in close touch with the Governments concerned with regard to the yet unimplemented paragraphs of the resolution.

Notes

1/ United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1017, No. 14903.

2/ Ibid., vol. 75, No. 972.







Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21961
23 November 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Further to our communications concerning the inhuman practices of the Iraqi occupying authorities in Kuwait, we have the honour to transmit herewith a report on the damage done to the Kuwaiti health services as a result of the barbarous occupation and invasion.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: English]

Iraqi invading forces emptied hospitals and
medical centres of assets

Al-Jahra'a Hospital

1. Intensive-care units
2. Operating-room equipment
3. X-ray equipment
4. Medicines
5. Furniture and medical equipment of out-patient and specialized clinics
6. Air-conditioning systems

Al-Nassim Medical Centre (Al-Jahra'a)

All equipment and medical instruments as well as the furniture and air-conditioning systems were confiscated.

Ibn Sina Specialized Hospital

The magnetic resonance imager (MRI) was confiscated and some equipment of the operating rooms, intensive-care units, beam machines, a considerable amount of medicines and the CAT-scan equipment were confiscated as well.

Physiotherapy Hospital

The invading forces seized most of the medical and therapeutic equipment such as:

1. Short wave
2. Ultrasound
3. Infra-red lamps
4. Laser
5. Vibrators
6. Differential current machine

Maternity Hospital

1. Most of the premature infant incubators
2. Most of the medicines and fluids at the central pharmacy
3. Some equipment of the out-patient and specialized clinics
4. Ultrasound machine

/...

Hamed Al-Essa Centre for Kidney and Organ Implantation

Most of the medical equipment was confiscated such as:

1. X-ray machines
2. Kidney-dialysis machines
3. Operating-room equipment
4. Intensive-care units
5. Medicines and fluids at the pharmacy
6. Medical equipment of the out-patient clinics
7. Furniture

Islamic Medical Centre

It was shelled with artillery guns and the following items were confiscated:

1. Laboratory and research equipment
2. Medicines and fluids
3. Furniture and air-conditioning systems
4. The medical library was set on fire

Medical Emergency Department

1. One hundred thirty-five fully-equipped ambulance vehicles were confiscated
2. Radio and communication equipment were stolen
3. Mobile medical units, used during Haj time, were stolen (two vans)
4. Furniture

Medical warehouses

1. A large amount of medical equipment
2. Medicines and fluids
3. All medicine shipments at Shuaiba port were seized
4. Furniture

Kuwait Medicine Company Plant

It was totally seized and is being run by the Iraqis. All medicines and manufacturing equipment were confiscated.

General warehouses of the Health Ministry

All inventories of the Ministry's general warehouses were seized and transferred on tens of trucks. The stolen items include the following:

/...

1. Furniture
2. Stationery and office supplies
3. Desks and chairs
4. Air-conditioning units
5. Water coolers
6. Rugs and carpets
7. Typewriters
8. Xerox machines

Central blood bank (Al-Jabriya)

1. Laboratory equipment
2. Blood refrigerators
3. Blood preservative chemicals
4. All blood deposits in the bank
5. Frozen plasma

Social care homes

They housed 1,600 patients (mentally retarded, crippled, senior citizens, handicapped and orphans)

1. Medical equipment of the out-patient clinics was confiscated
2. Medicines
3. Furniture and air-conditioning units

Health centres and clinics

All assets of the out-patient clinics were confiscated including stethoscopes, blood-pressure instruments, ear and eye examination equipment, oxygen cylinders, medicines, furniture and electric appliances.

Only 34 out of 72 health centres have been operational since 5 October.

Kuwait Centre for Cancer Treatment

1. Beam equipment
2. Operating rooms
3. Out-patient clinic equipment
4. Furniture

The Assistant Director of the Centre was shot dead when he tried to bar the soldiers from stripping the Centre of its contents.

/...

Allergy Centre

1. Laboratory and research equipment
2. Treatment equipment
3. All medicines prescribed for sensitive chest cases such as asthma
4. Furniture and medical equipment of out-patient clinics
5. Beam machines

Burns Treatment Centre (under construction)

1. Operating rooms
2. Intensive-care unit
3. Burns treatment equipment
4. Physio-therapy equipment
5. Furniture

Al-Addan Hospital

1. X-ray machines
2. Laser-beam machine
3. Operating-room equipment (most)
4. Intensive-care units
5. Medicines and fluids at the central pharmacy
6. Xerox machines and I.D. photo cameras

Amiri Hospital

1. Intensive-care units
2. Kidney-dialysis machines
3. Some operating-room equipment
4. Some X-ray machines

Mubarak Hospital

1. Some beam equipment
2. Some medicines and fluids
3. Some operating-room equipment



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S/21962
23 November 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 23 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE OF
KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Further to our correspondence concerning the inhuman practices perpetrated in Kuwait by the occupying Iraqi authorities, we have the honour to transmit herewith a letter from Kuwait reporting such practices and describing some of the suffering inflicted on our population in Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

During the two months' occupation by the Iraqi régime, all the inhabitants of Kuwait have lived through tragic and devastating events. Their morale and resolve have been sapped by a campaign of intimidation and terror. Over the last three weeks, the occupying forces have shown their true colours and revealed themselves as perfidious and depraved. Under cover of darkness, soldiers of the Iraqi army have forced their way into Kuwaiti houses, dragging the youngest occupants from their beds and taking them away blindfold, then herding out the others before setting fire to their homes.

The people living in Kuwait, whether Kuwaitis, Arabs or foreigners, feel that the situation has deteriorated to the point where no one any longer feels safe from arrest, torture or murder. Each day brings more tragic and terrifying events, while the Iraqi régime deliberately sets out to demoralize the inhabitants of Kuwait. Kuwaitis trying to leave for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia via Nuwaysib (the only way open to them if they do not want to stay) have their passports and everything they have with them (gold, jewellery, silver, etc.) confiscated, and lose everything they own in their effort to escape from an unknown fate from a life in terror and slavery. In all parts of the country, the inhabitants are awakened by shooting, houses going up in flames and raids by soldiers who steal whatever they want and constantly carry out searches, routine interrogations, etc. Kuwait City is burning and its inhabitants no longer feel safe. The international community can no longer remain indifferent to the fate of its inhabitants.

Innocent citizens are cold-bloodedly killed, arrested and tortured.

Persons who were arrested and later released, including Indians, Moroccans, Egyptians and Kuwaitis, report the following facts:

1. Soldiers broke into their house or their apartment at 4 or 5 o'clock in the morning;
2. Blindfolded, they were herded out of their homes by force after being beaten;
3. They were taken for interrogation to an Army centre and were charged with weapons possession or being opposed to Saddam Hussein;
4. Kuwaiti citizens were taken to prison, where their hands and feet were chained. Foreign citizens who have since returned to their countries have reported that the soldiers gave the Kuwaitis brackish yellowish water to drink, showered them with filth, kicked them in the legs and struck them repeatedly;
5. Detainees were continually tortured by having electric cables attached to sensitive parts of their bodies and were whipped on the soles of the feet until they bled;
6. All were forced to sign a confession declaring their opposition to the Al-Sabah family;

/...

7. They were given only one piece of bread to eat every day;

8. They were allowed to go to the lavatory only once a day;

9. Kuwaitis who have emerged alive from this nightmare speak with horror of having heard the cries of their tortured or murdered fellow-prisoners. Upon release, some of them were given medication in the form of a capsule; most of them were losing blood from their wounds, and were told not to see a doctor unless they wanted to go back to prison.

Only those foreigners who pledged to leave Kuwait were exempt from imprisonment and torture.

Eye-witness accounts:

1. A middle-aged Palestinian related how, as he was driving along in one of the districts of Kuwait City, some soldiers from the Army stopped him and all the other drivers and they were all rounded up at a particular place. Then the street they were in was cleared and all who lived there were interrogated. The soldiers then opened fire on five little Kuwaiti girls who were blindfolded.

2. In another district in the north of Kuwait City, three little eight-year-old girls threw stones at some soldiers who were passing by. Half an hour later, a group of about 100 soldiers arrived in jeeps equipped with heavy machine-guns and fired on the houses for three hours in the presence of their owners. After the shooting, an old man and an old woman threw themselves to the ground in tears, broken-hearted, for their house was all they had.

3. The Iraqis asked a Kuwaiti doctor at the Mubarak Hospital to submit an inventory of medical stores but he was slow to comply. Thereupon, the occupying soldiers forced him to come out, in full view of his colleagues and the hospital staff, and shot him through the head.

4. Four Kuwaiti Red Cross officials, arrested while bringing food to the hospitals and to the bedridden, later vanished without a trace.

5. In the Musharrif district, army troops arrested three small girls. Ten days later they returned them to their homes, but after ringing the doorbell they opened fire on them in full view of their parents. The bodies of these young martyrs bore the marks of the ill treatment they had endured.

6. Five young Kuwaiti girls who had volunteered to help the doctors at the Adan Hospital because of the shortage of nurses and auxiliary staff, were arrested. Their bodies were discovered 10 days later. They had died of head wounds. Even the Iraqi doctors were horrified at this sight, and could not restrain their tears.



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S/21963
23 November 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

Letter dated 23 November 1990 from the Permanent Representative of
Kuwait to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Further to our correspondence concerning the inhuman practices perpetrated by the Iraqi occupying authorities in Kuwait, we have the honour to transmit herewith an eyewitness account of some of these practices, which are aimed at the physical and moral extermination of the people and institutions of Kuwait.

I should be grateful if you would have this letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex

[Original: English]

Iraqi occupying forces arrested and killed two mosque preachers because they objected to the Iraqi invasion and urged the Kuwaiti people to maintain their patience and resistance. During the assault and arrest operation, Iraqi soldiers seized the air-conditioning units and carpets at the two mosques.

In another mosque, the preacher was arrested by the Iraqi intelligence for refusing to comply with orders of promoting the Baath Party and its objectives instead of preaching Islam. The officers tortured the preacher inside the mosque in front of the praying crowd.

The occupying forces have stepped up their coercive measures of deporting Failaka island residents to Kuwait City and the island has been totally emptied of its inhabitants.

A large number of Kuwaiti captives who were released lately suffered bad health and low morale because of the torture they were subjected to by the Iraqi intelligence apparatus.

Some captives were exposed to electrical shocks in their private parts, severely battered and hung from their hands or feet. Their bodies had burns, bruises and swellings on them. The captives were in a terrible condition and some of them suffered amnesia and raved hysterically.

Iraqi soldiers opened fire and killed three Kuwaiti children in front of a supermarket. The children, aged seven to eight years old, were innocently chanting the national anthem of Kuwait and shouting the name of Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmed al-Sabah, the Emir, as a group of Iraqi soldiers immediately opened fire and shot them dead in front of their mother, who had a nervous breakdown.

In other incidents, the occupying forces slayed a Kuwaiti man and left his corpse hanging from a traffic post for one week.

The occupying forces shot another man to death in front of his house as his wife and children watched. They left behind a piece of paper showing the victim's name and signed by the "Execution Group".

An elderly woman said the occupying troops arrested her 19-year-old grandson and charged him with giving a gun to one of his friends who was also arrested and tortured. The woman said the soldiers took her grandson outside the house and fired their guns randomly in the air to get the residents' attention. When the woman looked through the window, the soldiers shot her grandson in the head, chest and belly.

The Iraqi occupying forces seized a cemetery and the troops destroyed tombstones and drove their military vehicles over the graves without the least respect for the sanctity of the deceased and the graveyard was turned into military quarters.



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21964
24 November 1990
ENGLISH
ORIGINAL: ARABIC

LETTER DATED 24 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF THE LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED
TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL

Under Article 28, paragraph 3, of the Charter and the provisions of article 5
of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council,

In view of the gravity of the situation in the Gulf, a situation which is
liable to explode at any time and to jeopardize international peace and security
and thus to involve the full responsibility of the Security Council as the organ
entrusted with the maintenance of peace and security, I have the honour to request
you, on behalf of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, pursuant to the
provisions of article 6 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security
Council, to ask the Security Council to meet, as a matter of urgency, to consider
the serious situation in the Gulf. This meeting should be held in Geneva in order
to enable the countries concerned and the greatest possible number of Member States
of the United Nations to attend.

(Signed) Ali A. TREIKI
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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S/21965
26 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF KUWAIT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF
THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to request that the Security Council meet urgently to resume consideration of the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait".

(Signed) Mohammad A. ABULHASAN
Ambassador
Permanent Representative



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21966
27 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Finland, Kuwait and Zaire:
draft resolution

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions 660 (1990) of 2 August 1990, 662 (1990) of 9 August 1990 and 674 (1990) of 29 October 1990,

Reiterating its concern for the suffering caused to individuals in Kuwait as a result of the invasion and occupation of Kuwait by Iraq,

Gravely concerned at the ongoing attempt by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations,

1. Condemns the attempts by Iraq to alter the demographic composition of the population of Kuwait and to destroy the civil records maintained by the legitimate Government of Kuwait;

2. Mandates the Secretary-General to take custody of a copy of the population register of Kuwait, the authenticity of which has been certified by the legitimate Government of Kuwait and which covers the registration of population up to 1 August 1990;

3. Requests the Secretary-General to establish, in co-operation with the legitimate Government of Kuwait, an Order of Rules and Regulations governing access to and use of the said copy of the population register.



General Assembly Security Council

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A/45/799
S/21967

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

GENERAL ASSEMBLY
Forty-fifth session
Agenda item 28

SECURITY COUNCIL
Forty-fifth year

THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA:
THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND
SECURITY AND PEACE INITIATIVES

Letter dated 26 November 1990 from the Permanent Representative of
the United States of America to the United Nations addressed to the
Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to note the following. The United States reaffirms its support for a peaceful and negotiated settlement ending the armed conflict in El Salvador. My Government fully supports the appeal made to you by the Governments of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua on 21 November 1990, circulated as document A/45/737-S/21956, that you personally make the necessary representations to the Farabundo Marti Front for National Liberation (FMLN) in order to achieve a rapid cessation of the hostilities that commenced in El Salvador on 20 November 1990.

The United States notes that in your statement of 20 November 1990, you refer to the commitment of the FMLN to refrain from certain categories of actions in order to strengthen confidence in its political will and in your good offices. My Government welcomes your statement that you trust and expect that this commitment will be adhered to, especially with regard to unarmed civilians.

My Government shares your belief, also reflected in your statement of 20 November, that given the necessary political will, the possibility of achieving important progress is within sight. My Government endorses without reservation your fervent appeal for restraint at this critical juncture, so that the continuing cycle of violence does not jeopardize the negotiating process.

On 20 November, the international community adopted by consensus General Assembly resolution 45/15, a call for the parties in El Salvador to make every possible effort to reach a negotiated solution to the armed conflict in that

A/45/799
S/21967
English
Page 2

country. On that same day, the FMLN launched its large-scale military campaign in callous disregard for its commitment to the negotiations process under your auspices.

These attacks are deplorable and unjustified. The United States urges the FMLN to cease its acts of violence and to negotiate in good faith with the Government of El Salvador. We are especially disturbed by the FMLN's explanation that they sought to "counter-balance the military operations of the armed forces and reduce its resistance to a political solution" while reiterating its "serious and good faith commitment not to abandon the process of negotiation". To expiate their aggression by such pretenses is unconscionable.

I request that this letter be circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under item 28 of the agenda, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Thomas R. PICKERING



Security Council

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GENERAL

S/21968
27 November 1990

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

LETTER DATED 26 NOVEMBER 1990 FROM THE PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE
OF EGYPT TO THE UNITED NATIONS ADDRESSED TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE
SECURITY COUNCIL

In my capacity as Chairman of the Islamic Group at the United Nations, I have the pleasure to request that H.E. Mr. A. Engin Ansay, Permanent Observer of the Organization of the Islamic Conference to the United Nations be invited to participate in the Security Council's discussion of the item entitled "The situation between Iraq and Kuwait" in accordance with rule 39 of the Council's provisional rules of procedure.

(Signed) Amre M. MOUSSA
Ambassador
Permanent Representative
